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HE CONTEMPORARY ENFORCEMENT of international humanitarian
law faces a world different from Nuremberg. The World War Two
Allies, confronted with criminality of staggering proportions, conducted the
trials of Nazi leaders after Germany's unconditional surrender. Captured Nazi
archives provided a documentary outline of the Reich's unimaginable plans
and Allied military occupation of Germany allowed the Nuremberg
prosecutors direct access to witnesses.
In prosecuting war crimes in modern civil conflicts, the judicial starting
point is transformed. The internationalization of war crimes prosecutions is
seen as a way to restore confidence and allow reconciliation. But prosecutions
may begin while a conflict is still underway. Achievement of a ceasefire or
peace agreement does not mean that former belligerents welcome the prospect
of being held responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian
law. International peacekeepers can separate opposing forces and protect
international aid workers, yet are unlikely to have a force structure sufficient to
protect all potential witnesses against irregulars and hooligans. There is no
occupation government that displaces the civil administration of the former
belligerents. While political sentiment may change over time, the wartime
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political parties are likely to remain influential long after the fighting stops.
Former belligerents will lack credibility in trying war crimes accusations against
their own forces and their opponents. International war crimes prosecutors will
also be hard put to rely on the belligerents for the faithful collection of evidence
and eyewitness testimony.
What this means for war crimes prosecutions is brought home in the
experience of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
The Tribunal was created by the United Nations Security Council in 1993
under Chapter VII, 1 in the middle of the armed conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. In November 1995, while the Dayton Peace Accord was under
negotiation, the Tribunal indicted a number of defendants for their roles in
ethnic cleansing in the Lasva Valley. A prominent defendant was Colonel
Tihomir Blaskic, who held the position of regional military commander for the
Croatian Defense Council of Herceg,Bosna, an internationally unrecognized
Bosnian Croat entity within the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.2 Blaskic
surrendered to the Tribunal on April 1, 1996, and was permitted to remain
under house arrest in The Hague.

The Blaskic Subpoenas
On January 15, 1997, the Tribunal Prosecutor issued trial subpoenas for the
production of records from, variously, the Government of Croatia, Croatian
Defense Minister Gojko Susak, the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and the custodian of records of the central archive of the former Ministry of
Defense of Herceg,Bosna. These subpoenas have become the center of
controversy. The practical outcome of the case may define whether an
international criminal tribunal is able to function effectively as a
truth,determining forum, for the advantages of impartiality and credibility
enjoyed by an international tribunal are of little use if such a court cannot
procure the production of evidence necessary to a fair and accurate
adjudication. The subpoena dispute tests whether an international court can
effectively substitute itself for national tribunals in the trial of war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity.
The evidence requested in the subpoenas duces tecum addressed to
the Republic of Croatia and to Bosnia and Herzegovina focuses on
military operations in Central Bosnia. The requested disclosures were broad,
in the trial process, more than a year after the
and came
The subpoena to Croatia included requests for
original Blaskic
BlaSkiC's notes and writings sent to the Croatian Ministry of Defense and to the
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defense authorities of Herceg,Bosna, communications received from those
quarters, communications between the Croatian Ministry of Defense and other
officials of Herceg,Bosna, records on Croatia's contribution of weapons,
supplies, and military units to the Bosnian conflict, and files on investigations
or prosecutions concerning the 1993 attacks against Muslim civilians in
Ahmici and other villages in the Lasva Valley.
The scope of the prosecutor's demand might seem ambitious until one
recalls that proving grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions requires
evidence that the Bosnia conflict was "international" in each particular sector
of the fighting. Otherwise, according to the Tribunal's earlier decisions in the
Tadic case,3 the charges of grave breach cannot be sustained, since the
universal jurisdiction of grave breaches only applies in international conflicts.
In the case of Tihomir Blaskic, an officer of the Croatian Defence Council
("HVO") of the Croatian Community of Herceg,Bosna, it is Croatia's
involvement with the HVO and the fighting in central Bosnia that will
determine the international nature of the conflict for purposes of grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions.
Many of the subpoenaed records are also central to the proof of command
responsibility. Command responsibility holds that it is not sufficient to place
liability on the foot soldier who carries out an illegal action or atrocity. Rather,
a system of restraint in wartime depends on the role of a commanding officer in
controlling his troops, and his duty in the chain of command to prevent and
punish wanton acts. A commanding officer is to be held criminally liable for
failing to attempt to controL his troops where he knows that widespread atrocities
are being committed, as well as for ordering troops to take such reprehensible
action. This is a necessary part of deterrence, and the moral responsibility and
retribution which criminal law seeks to serve.
Proof of command responsibility is likely to come from one of two sourcesthe testimony of military personnel about the commander's orders and actions
or the documentary record of a military operation, including copies of written
orders and communications. Either way, the information must come from
"official" sources.
Command responsibility is central in the charges against Blaskic. He may
not have personally participated in the murders and mayhem committed
against Muslim civilians in 1993 in the Lasva campaign area. Rather, Blaskic
will bear criminal responsibility if he ordered or encouraged his troops to
engage in the atrocities,4 or if he failed to monitor or control their actions,
allowing the troops to run amok.5
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A more controversial theory of command responsibility might dispense with
the need for any particularized evidence. Criminal liability could flow, on an
aggressive theory, from the simple fact of the defendant's position in the chain
of command and the widespread commission of atrocities by troops under his
command. But even if this were an attractive theory-and, to be clear, it is not
provided for by the Tribunal's statute6-the defendant must surely be
permitted an affirmative defense, to show that he justifiably did not know of
the misconduct, or made efforts to stop its execution. "Official" sources are
likely to be important for exculpatory evidence.
In cases between sovereign States, the fact, finder ordinarily relies upon the
State parties to produce pertinent evidence. There is no general right of
"discovery" against the opposing State in an international adjudication, say,
before the International Court of Justice, although a special master can be
assigned to investigate and report to the Court and an adverse inference can be
drawn from a State party's failure to muster proof. 7 Each State is required to
make its case, based on its own records and witnesses, and is free to judge
whether to disclose sensitive documents to strengthen the case, or to retain the
advantages of confidentiality.
Criminal trials are a different matter. They are not State,to,State contests.
A criminal conviction deprives an individual of his liberty and reputation, and
involves a rights,based claim to fairness. Criminal proof presumes there will be
a completeness of investigation and documentation to give meaning to the
high standard for conviction, whether it is phrased as "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt" or another test of similar gravity. In a national setting, a
criminal court has wide latitude to demand the production of evidence from
third parties and even from official sources. In an international setting,
individuals do not ordinarily enjoy legal personality, but when placed on trial
for international criminal responsibility, they must be guaranteed fair process.
Criminal justice is a newcomer in international fora. The ad hoc tribunals
created by the Security Council for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are the
first charged with the international enforcement of the law of war since
Nuremberg. It is hardly surprising, then, to have difficult problems of first
impression. The question of how to obtain evidence is a fundamental test, both
to assure effectiveness in enforcing international humanitarian law, and to
assure fairness to individual defendants.
The subpoena duces tecum issued in the BlaSkic case to Bosnia and
Herzegovina was accepted by the Bosnian government, although Bosnia
indicated that it could not assure the compliance of a nominally subordinate
official, the custodian of records of the former Defense Ministry of
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Herceg,Bosna.8 Croatia, however, disputed the authority of the International
Tribunal to issue a subpoena duces tecum on several grounds: 1) it is improper to
issue a mandatory order to a sovereign State, especially an order that purports
to carry a "penalty" for non' compliance, as might be implied by the word
"subpoena"; 2) no order can be addressed to a particular State official, here,
Croatian Defense Minister SuSak, and States are entitled to decide how to
comply with requests for disclosure; and 3) Croatia can withhold information
affecting national security, a judgment that Croatia reserves to itself.
Croatia turned over some of the documents requested by the Prosecutor, but
continued to challenge the authority of the Tribunal to enforce any subpoena
demand. The Tribunal judge who issued the subpoenas, Judge Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald of the United States, set down the matter for full briefing and
hearing before the three judges ofTrial Chamber II, including Judge Elizabeth
Odio Benito of Costa Rica and Judge Saad Saood Jan of Pakistan. She also
invited amicus curiae to address four questions: whether a subpoena duces tecum
can issue to a State, whether it can issue to a high government official of a
State, whether claims of national security privilege must be accepted, and the
appropriate remedies in the event of non, compliance.
The Trial Chamber Decision
On the first question, in a decision rendered on July 18, 1997,9 the Trial
Chamber adroitly placed to one side the distracting controversy over
nomenclature. The term "subpoena" is used in the Court's own rules,10 but the
Trial Chamber noted that the real dispute was "the International Tribunal's
authority and power to issue binding compulsory orders, rather than the
particular nomenclature used for such orders."lt This power could either be
granted expressly, or could be inherent in the authority of the Tribunal.
Judge McDonald held that there was such a power. The Tribunal was
created by the Security Council under Chapter vn authority as a subordinate
organ,12 yet "must also be possessed of a large degree of independence in order
to constitute a truly separate institution and in order to be able to fulfil properly
its judicial mandate, free from political considerations."lJ For a criminal trial
chamber, it is "imperative" to have "all the relevant evidence before it when
making its decisions," if only to "guarantee the rights of the accused."14 Croatia
conceded that the Security Council could have granted the Tribunal the power
to issue binding orders against States in an authorizing statute-it was a
delegable power-and simply disputed whether the Council had done S.o.15 An
absence of express power to issue orders against States in the Statute of the
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Tribunal would not determine the matter, Judge McDonald found, since the
Tribunal's granted powers must also be interpreted to make it an effective
institution. A teleological interpretation of the powers of UN organs was relied
on by the International Court ofJustice in the Reparations Case, 16 the Effects of
Awards Case,17 and the Certain Expenses Case. IS
The Tribunal must have "the inherent power to compel the production of
documents necessary for a proper execution of its judicial function," Judge
McDonald concluded. 19 Because many of the crimes within the Tribunal's
compass involve military operations, military records "may constitute vital
evidence."2o National courts have the power to compel the production of
evidence from third parties, whether in the criminal justice systems of France,
Germany, Pakistan, Spain, Scotland, Canada, or the United States.21 The
European Court ofJustice enjoys the power to compel State parties to produce
all documents and information "which the court considers desirable," and may
compel non,party member States and institutions "to supply all information
which the Court considers necessary for the proceedings."22 Similar power was
necessary for the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to fairly
adjudicate war crimes cases.
The decision did not rest on teleology alone. The Tribunal's Statute
sustained the power to gather evidence by compulsory orders, Judge McDonald
found. Article 19 of the Statute, approved by the Security Council, entitles a
judge to issue "any ... orders as may be required for the conduct of the trial,"
and Article 29 requires that States comply with any orders issued by a trial
chamber of the T ribunalY The mandatory nature of these measures is hardly
surprising in a Tribunal created under Chapter VII authority. The power of the
Tribunal to bind States is shown, for example, in the Tribunal's right to require
States to defer a national prosecution in favor of the international case. The
Report of the Secretary,General on the establishment of the Tribunal similarly
notes that orders for the surrender or transfer of defendants "shall be
considered to be the application of an enforcement measure under Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations."24
On the issue of possible penalties for non, compliance, the Trial Chamber
was more reticent, finding the question not necessary for decision. The term
"subpoena" is not meant to be a root,and,branch transplant from common law
systems, Judge McDonald found; the alternative term "assignation" is used in
the authentic French text. There is, therefore, no necessary connotation of
penalty or coercive action.2S It remains an open question what penalty, if any,
may attend a State failure to comply with an order of production, Judge
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McDonald said. And a "penalty" could amount to no more than a "note of
non-compliance and reference of the matter to the Security Council."z6
Addressing subpoenas to named government officials was also approved by
the Trial Chamber. The Tribunal has the power to direct binding orders to
States and to private individuals; hence, it broke no barrier to permit their
direction to named officials of the government. Although a State may
designate a liaison to assist in the production of evidence, it cannot shield
particular government officials from the duty of production. "The
International Tribunal must have powers that are both practical and effective,"
Judge McDonald noted, "and, as a criminal institution, this dictates that it seek
the most direct route to any evidence which may have a bearing on the finding
of guilt or innocence of the accused."z7
However, the Trial Chamber made a considerable concession to the
conflicting obligations that may constrain a State official. States and
individuals have a duty of compliance with the binding orders of the Tribunal.
But a resistant State may interfere with an official's attempt to comply, and
forbid him to tum over desired documents. It could be unfair to place an
individual in such a difficult position of conflict, Judge McDonald concluded.
On the principle of ultra posse nemo tenetur-that an impossible act cannot be
required-and because the Tribunal lacks police power to protect individuals
against State retaliation, such an official is permitted to explain why
compliance is not within his individual choice.28 Of course, other witnesses
may face local retaliation for compliance with orders to testify, but the Tribunal
did not say what would happen if an ordinary witness made the same plea.
Judge McDonald also made clear that overbreadth or lack of specificity of a
subpoena remains a potentially valid ground for challenge. Looking to national
practice, the Tribunal noted that trial subpoenas could not be used for "fishing
expeditions," but had to look toward the production of admissible or potentially
admissible evidence. Croatia's objections on grounds of overbreadth were
referred to the separate Trial Chamber conducting the Blaski6 trial.Z9
Finally, the Trial Chamber ruled that national security claims deserved
careful consideration but not automatic deference.3o The need for pertinent
evidence at trial had to be weighed alongside the valid interest that States may
have in the protection of sensitive information. Any blanket exemption would
cripple the doctrine of command responsibility, since the records of military
operations lie at the center of proof of a commander's conduct. National
security claims have to be made with specificity, and evaluated by the Tribunal
in light of the procedures available to minimize the prejudice of disclosure, such
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as redaction of documents and closed proceedings. In the last analysis, the
responsibility for weighing the concerns belongs to the Tribunal itself.3!
The Appeals Chamber Decision
After the decision of Trial Chamber IT in July 1997, Croatia immediately took
an appeal. Although the BlaSkic trial had already begun on June 24, 1997, the
Appeals Chamber stayed enforcement of the trial subpoenas.32 The appeal
attracted amicus curiae briefs from several governments.33 The decision was
delivered several months later, on October 29, 1997, with an opinion by President
of the Tribunal Antonio Cassese,34 dramatically headlined by the Tribunal's press
office as "unanimously quash[ing]" the subpoenas issued to Croatia and Defense
Minister SuSak,35 but importanciy holding that "binding Qrders" could be issued to
Croatia,36 and that there was no absolute national security privilege.
The overall judgment was in fact complicated, but two architectural
features are clear. Each calls into some question the future competence of the
body. First, the Appeals
International Tribunal as a judicial
Chamber went out of its way to hold that the Tribunal lacks any direct
enforcement powers against States to obtain the production of evidence. If a
State declines to produce evidence pursuant to a binding order, the Tribunal's
only recourse is to report the matter to the Security Council.37 The Tribunal, in
the Appeals Chamber's view, cannot even recommend a course of action to the
Council.38 There is little explanation of this result, especially against a
background in which the European Court of Justice is now permitted to
sanction States in civil cases.39 Judge Cassese notes, simply, that "[h]ad the
drafters of the [Tribunal's] Statute intended to vest the International Tribunal
with such a power they would have expressly provided for it. In the case of an
international judicial body, this is not a power that can be regarded as inherent
in its functions.,,40 The time pressure on the Security Council in creating the
Tribunal in 1993 may not warrant such a spare account of the drafters'
intention. One can instead take the result as the Appeals Chamber's estimate
of what structure will or will not disturb some member countries.41 The danger,
of course, is that this dependency of the Tribunal potentially involves the
Security Council in the intimate decisions of the conduct of a trial. Although
the failure of a requested country to surrender or arrest an indicted defendant
is, under the Court's
rules,42 also reported to the Security Council,
the entry of politics into enforcement is perhaps less troubling at the pretrial
stage than to have politics shape the availability of inculpatory and exculpatory
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evidence in an ongoing case. The limits of the autonomy of the Tribunal as an
independent judicial institution are sharply drawn by this outcome.43
One may also wonder why the Appeals Chamber chose to address penalties
at this stage of the proceeding, before it is known whether Croatia would
comply with the Tribunal's orders of production. Judge McDonald held that it
was premature to decide possible penalties for non, compliance. Judge Cassese
supposed that this depended on an idea of "ripeness" peculiar only to American
, jurisprudence, though judicial prudence is surely not so culturally specific.
Under a "tariff' theory of jurisprudence, a disobedient
may wish to know
the "cost" of his defiance in advance, but a Court wishing to establish its
authority does not owe a duty to the recalcitrant to announce in advance the
costs and benefits of resistance.
The Appeals Chamber's second restriction was to allow States to decide who
can testify as a document custodian.44 A named official cannot be: called to
appear in court, the appellate judges held, because States traditionally have had
the right under customary international law to decide how they will go about
fulfilling their international obligations, and individual officials are insulated
from liability for acts undertaken on behalf of the State. But, as the Appeals
Chamber remarks without stopping, the major exception to this immunizing rule
of "acts of State" has been the law of war crimes and international humanitarian
law.45 It is a fundamental tenet of the modem law of war that State officials
cannot take refuge from individual responsibility for illegal acts by invoking a
claim of superior orders or State authority. It is surprising then, indeed, that the
appeals judges should resurrect a doctrine of "acts of State" when it weakens the
very procedures seeking to give teeth to the law of war.
The Court's misstep may be a result of not comprehending the full function
of a custodian of documents as an evidentiary witness at trial. Documents
cannot be assumed to be authentic, accurate, or complete. A custodian of
documents is needed to authenticate the documents as genuine, to describe
the routine by which they were kept, to describe how they were searched for
and retrieved, and to say whether the run of documents is known to be
complete. Even in ordinary conditions of peacetime, all custodians are not
created equal-the evidentiary weight of the documents may depend on the
persuasiveness of the testimony of the custodian. In the fog of war, with fluid
conditions on a military front, the testimony of a custodian of documents is
even more critical-to establish, for instance, whether a set of incoming
reports from a field commander is preserved in whole or only in part.
Commissioning the former belligerent States in the Yugoslav conflict to pick
and choose which officials will be available to testify can undercut the strength
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of the prosecution's evidence, and imperil a defendant's search for exculpatory
evidence.
Equally troublesome is the Appeals Chamber's intimation that the Tribunal
may not call factual eyewitnesses who happen to be government officials.
Although Croatia's challenge concerns document subpoenas, with no issue or
decision in the Trial Chamber concerning subpoenas ad testificandum, the
Appeals Chamber went out of its way to address what eyewitnesses can be
subjected to a subpoena or binding order to testify. An individual acting in a
private capacity could be subpoenaed before the Tribunal, the Appeals
Chamber said.46 But a State official could not be summoned, either by
subpoena or binding order.47 And on the crucial question of when a witness has
acted in an official capacity, the Appeals Chamber gave the following
enigmatic explanation:
It should be noted that the class of "individuals acting in their private capacity"
also includes State agents who, for instance, witnessed a crime before they took
offlce, or found or were given evidentiary material of relevance for the
prosecution or the defence prior to the initiation of their official duties. In this
case, the individuals can legitimately be the addressees of a subpoena. Their role
in the prosecutorial or judicial proceedings before the International Tribunal is
unrelated to their current functions as State offlcials. 4S

But if the official witnessed an atrocity at first hand while serving in office, the
result is more equivocal. The Appeals Chamber posed
the example of a colonel who, in the course of a routine transfer to another
combat zone, overhears a general issuing orders aimed at the shelling of civilians
or civilian objects, In this case the individual must be deemed to have acted in a
private capacity and may therefore be compelled by the International Tribunal
to testify as to the events witnessed. By contrast, if the State official, when he
witnessed the crime, was actually exercising his functions, i.e., the monitoring of
the events was part of his offlcial functions, then he was acting as a State organ
and cannot be subpoenaed, as is illustrated by the case where the imaginary
colonel overheard the order while on an offlcial inspection mission concerning
the behaviour of the belligerents on the battlefield.49

It is not entirely clear, from this loosely drafted hypothetical, whether the
Appeals Chamber is resting on a distinction between "subpoenas" and "binding
orders," but it might appear from the heading of the section-"Whether the
International Tribunal May Issue Binding Orders to Individuals Acting in
Their Private Capacity"-that the colonel tasked to monitor battlefield
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operations is to be insulated from any form of compulsory process. This is an
extraordinary bouleversement, potentially depriving the Tribunal of a critical
source of testimony. A charitable reading of the opinion is to dismiss this as
unnecessary dicta and superfluous illustration.
One may also speculate that perhaps the Appeals Chamber was primarily
concerned with the initial addressee of an order to testify-that a binding order
still could be directed to the State in question, requiring the eyewitness
testimony of the particular named official. After all, the vital nature of official
eyewitness testimony is self,evident. This reading of}udge Cassese's opinion is
warranted by his ultimate conclusion that no grave harm should be done to the
efficacy of proof. "[I] n the case of State officials there is no compelling reason
warranting a departure from general rules [ofinternationallaw]. To make use
of the powers flowing from Article 29 of the Statute, it is sufficient for the
International Tribunal to direct its orders and requests to States ...." By
contrast, Judge Cassese observes, Croatia's claim of an unbounded national
security privilege would shield "documents that might prove of decisive
importance to the conduct of trials" and would "be tantamount to
undermining the very essence of the International Tribunal's functions."so
Nonetheless, the impracticality of the Tribunal's etiquette of address
remains. The Appeals Chamber notes later that, at least in contacting private
individuals, it "might jeopardise investigations" to go through the governments
of former belligerent States or entities, "some authorities of which might be
implicated in the commission of these crimes."S1 This would seem equally true
in the case of official eyewitnesses who formerly served as officials or employees
of the belligerent governments.
Despite the general immunity of international organizations from
judicial process, the Tribunal does not extend the umbrella of "public
capacity" to members of international peacekeeping forces. If a member of
UNPROFOR, IFOR, or SFOR "witnesses the commission or the planning of a
crime in a monitoring capacity, while performing his official functions, he
should be treated by the International Tribunal qua an individual. Such an
officer is present in the former Yugoslavia as a member of an international
armed force responsible for maintaining or enforcing peace and not qua a
member of the military structure of his own country."S2 It is less than clear
why the national versus international structure of a military organization
should change the availability of an individual eyewitness at trial, unless the
Appeals Chamber believes that members of a troop' contributing country
have a greater duty of obedience to Security Council decisions than do the
soldiers of belligerents.
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One promising caveat noted by the Appeals Chamber is that where a State
has been required to produce documents for trial and the pertinent State
official resists doing so, if the State is unable to coerce his compliance, then "it
is sound practice to 'downgrade', as it were, the State official to the rank of an
individual acting in a private capacity," and subject him to a subpoena and
proceedings for contempt.S3
But the Appeals Chamber also limits the scope of subpoena power in a
fashion that could make prosecutions more difficult. Citing Croatia's stylized
discovery process," the
complaint against "highly controversial
Appeals Chamber strictured that any requests must identify "specific
documents," rather than "broad categories," must not be "unduly onerous" or
"overly taxing" and certainly could not number in the "hundreds of
documents."s4 In trying to reconstruct battlefield supervision, these may not be
realistic limits.
Still, in important steps forward, the Appeals Chamber sustains the holding
that States are subject to binding orders of the Tribunal for the production of
documentary evidence, and dismisses Croatia's contention that an absolute
national security privilege should be recognized. Claims that the disclosure of
military documents will prejudice national security must be substantiated by
submitting the documents to the scrutiny of a Judge of the Trial Chamber forin
camera review, to decide whether they are relevant to the proceeding and
whether their relevance is "outweighed, in the appraisal of the Judge, by the
need to safeguard legitimate national security concerns."S5 Redaction of parts
of a document may be permitted before their use at trial. In the "exceptional
case" of "one or two particular documents" of great "delica[cy] from the
national security point of view," a State may be excused from submitting the
documents to the Judge based on generic representations of the reasons for
this. In a world in which it is dangerous to compromise human intelligence
sources and the capability of national technical means, this is a wise exception.
The Tribunal faces a considerable dilemma. On the one hand, the proof of
command responsibility for atrocities in wartime may often crucially depend on
evidentiary use of the belligerents' military records. On the other hand, even
former belligerents, and certainly "third party" countries, may have a legitimate
concern about national security. The ethical standards attending international
judicial office and the procedural precautions described in the Appeals
Chamber's opinion may not persuade national governments that they can
afford the risks of complete disclosure in the most serious cases. Thus, allowing
some practical elbow room in the opinion was the wisest course.
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Interestingly, here the Appeals Chamber humors a distinction among State
actors. Unlike its earlier insistence that no distinction should be recognized
among the sources of obligation to the Tribunal, even for former belligerent
States bound by the Dayton Accord,s6 the Appeals Chamber is willing to credit
a particular State's track record of cooperation with the Tribunal in assessing a
national security claim.s7
As a matter of interpretive method, one may question the acrobatics of the
"clear statement" rule-why the Appeals Chamber is willing to assume that
the drafters of the Tribunal's statute intended to preserve the procedural
immunity of State officials from subpoena, while newly compelling the
disclosure of national security documents. The Appeals Chamber heralds the
"innovative and sweeping obligation laid down in Article 29" with "its
undeniable effects on State sovereignty and national security."SB "Whenever
the Statute intends to place a limitation on the International Tribunal's
powers, it does so explicitly," the Appeals Chamber offers, adding that "it
would be unwarranted to read into Article 29 limitations or restrictions on the
powers of the International Tribunal not expressly envisaged either in Article
29 or in other provisions of the Statute."S9 One wonders why this interpretive
principle applies to the national security exception, but not to the subpoena of
State officials or the imposition of coercive measures on former belligerents
that decline to produce necessary documents.
One of the difficulties of the method of the BlaSkic appeals opinion, in the
long run, is what it means for the permanent International Criminal Court.
The ambivalence toward a tribunal's inherent powers in crafting a workable
procedure for investigations and trial places a heavy burden on the prospective
State parties of a permanent court, to assure that the new treaty provides for
most serious contingencies that a court will face. Unlike a domestic judiciary,
where structure and procedure can be crafted by the courts over time in a
dialogue with the legislative branch, creational acts in the international system
are far more occasional, and treaty amendment will be a slow and cumbersome
process. Thus the statute for a permanent court addressed by the Rome
diplomatic conference in 1998 must be measured against the strict standard of
whether its text yields a workable institution or a stillborn structure. In light of
BlaSkic, one cannot count upon the creative powers of judges to fill out an
incomplete sketch.
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Notes
Many of the documents cited in this article are available on the web-site of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. http://www.un.org/icty/.
1. S.C. Res. 827, May 25, 1993, U.N. S/RF$/827 (1993) (approving Report of the
Secretary-General and adopting the Statute of the Tribunal).
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IT-95-14-T, Nov. 15, 1996, and by Second Amended Indictment, id., Apr. 25, 1997.
3. See Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on JUrisdiction,
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic alk/a "Dule", No. IT-94-1-AR72, Appeals Chamber, Oct. 2,1995,
para. 81; Opinion and Judgment, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a "Dule", Trial Chamber, May
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Geneva Conventions because armed forces of Republika Srpska were not, at pertinent date and
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of the application ofinternational humanitarian law from one place to another in the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina depends upon the particular character of the conflict with which the
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forces] and the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
after the withdrawal of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] on 19 May 1992.").
4. In the words of the Second Amended Indictment, if he "planned, instigated, ordered or
otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution" of the illegal acts.
5. In the words of the Second Amended Indictment, if he "knew or had reason to know that
subordinates were about to perform illegal acts or had done so, and failed to take the necessary
and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof."
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